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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
dle course, rewrites the rule, beclouds it by substituting appreciation
of the criminality of conduct for knowledge of the nature of the act
and its wrongfulness, and, thereby, also rejects the New York concept
of "wrong" from a moral viewpoint.
The addition to the existing rule of a third branch to cover voli-
tional impairment is the course recommended by the Royal Commis-
sion minority. Substantively, it follows the reasoning of Parsons v.
State,'29 but is broader than "irresistible impulse," and was the test
adopted by New Mexico in State v. White 13 0 in 1954:
Assuming defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and his
knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of the mind, de-
fendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable
him to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty.13 1
Radical solutions to a problem which will always be difficult,
such as the abolition of legal guides to jurors, or the wholesale intro-
duction of treatment in lieu of punishment, will result in chaotic and
ineffectual administration of criminal law. It would seem preferable
to draft an addition along the line advocated which would meet much
of the valid criticism of the current New York statute, and yet retain
the fundamental ethical concepts embodied in the basic rule.
M
LIABILITY AND MEANING OF "Loss" IN NEW YORK
TITLE INSURANCE
Introduction
Title insurance is today the predominant method of protecting
title in many metropolitan areas.' Consequently, the nature of a
policy of title insurance is of concern to all attorneys and particularly
to attorneys practicing in the metropolitan areas.2  The purpose of
this article is to discuss the nature of this instrument. The area of
particular emphasis will be the liability placed upon the insurer. This
will lead to a better understanding of the rights and duties arising
out of this particular insurer-insured relationship.
12981 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).
13058 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954).
131 Id. at -, 270 P.2d at 730.
1 PROCEEDING OF THE A.B.A. SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ACCEPTABLE TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY, APP. A (1953).
2 Of the title insurance policies written in New York State in 1953, 91.5%
were issued against property in metropolitan New York City. PRELIMINARY
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE 40 (1955).
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NOTES
Origin of the Practice of Insuring Title
Prior to the practice of insuring title, a person's means of pro-
tecting himself from defects in his title were somewhat limited. One
way was to seek an opinion from an attorney or a conveyancer 3 and
to act according to the opinion rendered. However, if the buyer
acted on an opinion that was later proved to be erroneous, the lawyer
could only be held liable if he were shown to have been negligent in
the formation of the opinion.4  If the lawyer took reasonable pre-
cautions to investigate, the owner of the property had no recourse.
This doctrine of determining liability was also held applicable to con-
veyancers. 5 An additional method of securing protection was to ask
for covenants in the deed from the grantor. However, the protection
afforded in a deed was of course dependent upon the continued sol-
vency of the grantor. If the grantor of the property became insol-
vent, again, the owner was without recourse.
Recognizing this need and in satisfaction of it, the first title in-
surance company was formed in Philadelphia and received its fran-
chise in 1876.6 It was an additional protection, not dependent upon
bad faith as were the common-law actions of negligence, fraud, de-
ceit and the like. By spreading the risk of loss, the probability of
the holder of defective title being made whole was also greatly
increased.
Extent of the Liability of the Insurer
Title insurance is unique in that it is retrospective, not pros-
pective.7 It is designed to afford protection against past events, not
possible future occurrences. By contracting to insure title, the in-
surer undertakes to indemnify the insured if the title turns out to be
defective. 8 The sole object of title insurance is to cover possibilities
of loss through defects that may cloud or invalidate titles.9
Due to the public nature of the services performed by title in-
surance companies, it is believed by many that these companies are
public utilities, and as such, must insure every title that the courts
declare marketable. Such is not the fact. The title insurance com-
3 A conveyancer is ". . . one whose business it is to draw deeds, bonds,
mortgages, wills, writs or other legal papers, or to examine titles to real
estate." BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
4 See Godefroy v. Dalton, 6 Bing. 460, 130 Eng. Rep. 1357 (C.P. 1830);
Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060, 98 Eng. Rep. 74 (K.B. 1767).
5 Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. St. 161, 98 Am. Dec. 213 (1868).
6 Rhodes, Insurance of Real Estate Title, 10 CoNN. B.J. 206, 211 (1936).
7 Trenton Potteries Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 176 N.Y. 65, 72,
68 N.E. 132, 134 (1903).
8 Ibid.; Palliser v. Title Ins. Co., 61 Misc. 490, 491-92, 115 N.Y. Supp.
545, 546 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
9 Foebrenbach v. German-American Title & Trust Co., 217 Pa. 331, 66 AtL
561, 563 (1907).
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pany has a right to select its own risks.10 Once the company does
decide to insure, its liability extends to only those defects which are
in existence at the time the insured acquires his interest if he is a
purchaser (title guaranty) 1 or the date the policy is issued 12 if he
is a present owner wishing to insure (owner's policy of title insur-
ance). The basis for imposing liability is therefore found in this
agreement which the parties form. This contract is construed lib-
erally in favor of the insured and strictly as against the insurer.13
However, though it generally may be stated that this contract
is to be the final measure of liability between the parties, this rule
is somewhat modified by the doctrine of reformation. Under this
doctrine, the petitioning party must show that there was a mutual
mistake and the contract as evidenced by the instrument does not
show the actual intent of the parties.' 4  Because of the fact that these
are contracts of adhesion,15 the failure of the insured to read his con-
tract is not generally considered such negligence on his part or laches
to deprive him of the remedy of reformation. 16
In addition to its liability under the-policy, the company may be
liable for negligence in performing the title search and examination.
If the opinion the company renders is in error due to negligence in
the search or in the analysis of the facts disclosed by the search, the
company is liable provided the customer relied upon the opinion to
his detriment.' 7 This is similar to the general standard imposed upon
attorneys.' 8 Ordinarily under such circumstances, the customer will
claim under the policy. It is possible at times that it might be more
advantageous for him to bring the action in tort. For instance, if
the damages resulting from the reliance were greater than the face
10 See Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Rudershausen, 164 N.Y. Supp. 15
(Sup. Ct. App. T. 1917).11 See Mayers v. Van Schaick, 268 N.Y. 320, 197 N.E. 296 (1935); Trenton
Potteries Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 176 N.Y. 65, 68 N.E. 132 (1903).
12 See Empire Development Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 225 N.Y.
53, 121 N.E. 468 (1918).
13 See Broadway Realty Co. v. Lawyer's Title Ins. & Trust Co., 226 N.Y.
335, 337, 123 N.E. 754 (1919); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. New York
Title Ins. Co., 171 Misc. 854, 857-58, 12 N.Y.S.2d 703, 709 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
14 Empire Development Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., note 12 supra;
Trenton Potteries Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 176 N.Y. 65, 68 N.E.
132 (1903).
15 A contract of adhesion is one where it is felt that the parties are not of
equal bargaining power. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUm. L. REv. 629 (1943).
16 See Lewitt v. Jewelers' Safety Fund Soc'y, 249 N.Y. 217, 164 N.E. 29
(1928). See also VANCE, INSURANCE § 44, at 258-59 (3d ed. 1951).
17 Glyn v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 132 App. Div. 859, 117 N.Y. Supp.
424 (1st Dep't 1909). See also Ehmer v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 156
N.Y. 10, 50 N.E. 420 (1898) ; Dorr v. Massachusetts Title Ins. Co., 238 Mass.
490, 131 N.E. 191 (1921).
1S Absent negligence, an attorney is not liable for an honest mistake ofjudgment. Gimbel v. Waldman, 193 Misc. 758, 84 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct.
1948); Dallas v. Fassnach, 42 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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amount of the policy, he could collect the full amount of his damages,
thereby avoiding the limitation of the face amount of the policy.
Insurance companies may avoid the policy if they can show fraud
on the part of the insured.19 A standard clause in policies provides
for this by stating that:
Any untrue statement made by the insured . . . ; any untrue answer by the
insured . . . to material inquiries before the issuing of this policy, shall void
this policy.20
However, mere failure on the part of the insured to disclose any fact,
though clearly material, will not avoid such a policy unless the non-
disclosure was made with fraudulent intent.21 If the fact is not one
peculiar to his own knowledge,22 the insured may assume that the
insurer has acquired the information elsewhere and has no duty to
speak.23
It would seem that a provision in the contract stating that the
suppression of a material fact when the policy is obtained will void
the policy would protect the insurer from liability arising from facts
undiscovered by him but in the knowledge of the insured. However,
it was stated in Maggio v. Abstract Title and Mortgage Corporation 24
that "... knowledge of defects in the title by the insured in no way
lessens the liability of the insurer." 25 The courts seem to feel that
the insurer must rely primarily upon the information acquired by its
own methods of selection and to look to the applicant only for good
faith.2 6
A further limitation is placed upon the extent of an insurer's lia-
bility if his policy contains a "coinsurance clause." 27 Under this
clause, if the premises described in the contract are subsequently im-
proved or altered in an amount exceeding twenty per cent of the
19 See Browning v. Home Ins. Co., 71 N.Y. 508 (1877) (per curiam);
Vaughan v. United States Title Guarantee & Indemnity Co., 137 App. Div.
623, 122 N.Y. Supp. 393 (1st Dep't 1910).20 See City Title Ins. Co. policy No. 750 SF, Condition 5.
21 Browning v. Home Ins. Co., note 19 supra.
22 In a New York case, it was found that the insured withheld certain facts
and should have disclosed them. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. New York
Title Ins. Co., 171 Misc. 854, 12 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct. 1939). While at first
appearing to contradict the above stated rule, the case merely states the excep-
tion to the rule. In this case the facts undisclosed were peculiarly in the pos-
session of the insured. The facts in issue were certain credit statements affect-
ing the realty which were in the possession of the plaintiff and unavailable to
the defendant. We can see that in these circumstances, the court must impose
a duty to speak since no matter what methods of acquiring information the
insurer chooses, the information would not be available until the insured chose
to release it.23 VANCE, INSURANCE § 61, at 375 (3d ed. 1951).
24277 App. Div. 940, 98 N.Y.S.2d 899 (4th Dep't 1950) (mem. opinion).25Maggio v. Abstract Title & Mortgage Corp., 277 App. Div. 940, 941,
98 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1013 (4th Dep't 1950) (mem. opinion).26 VANCE, INSURANCE § 61, at 372 (3d ed. 1951).27 See City Title Ins. Co. policy No. 750 SF, Condition 12.
1958 ] NOTES
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
amount insured in the policy, the insurer will only be liable for that
proportion which 120 per cent of the amount of the policy bears to
the total value of the property as improved. This limitation can be
removed by rewriting the contract to reflect the new value of the
property. If this is not done, however, under the conditions stated
in the coinsurance clause, the insured becomes a coinsurer.
Therefore, we may say that the standard for affixing liability will
be the contract between the parties, modified by the doctrines of
reformation and fraud and limited in amount by the face value and
the coinsurance clause.
Nature and Purpose of the Title Insurance Contract
In addition to the main purpose of title insurance, that is, to
indemnify a person whose title turns out to be defective, a policy
holder receives another incidental benefit. Property covered by a
contract of title insurance is thereby rendered more readily salable.
By being able to present an insured title to the land to a prospective
purchaser, the vendor will not be obliged to wait until the objections
to title are cleared before the vendee will accept it. It makes land
"liquid."
However, the main purpose remains, to indemnify from loss
through defects in title to realty.28 As has been demonstrated, the
insurer's liability is determined according to the insurance contract
into which he enters with the insured.29 Many courts have therefore
been called upon to describe the legal nature of this agreement. Vari-
ous text writers have also defined this instrument which is the basis
of the insurer-insured relationship.
At this point, we can move closer to an understanding of the
nature of this relationship if we consider some of these definitions.
One writer has said that
title insurance is an agreement whereby the insurer, for a valuable considera-
tion, agrees to indemnify the insured in a specified amount against loss through
defects in title to real estate wherein the latter has an interest, either as
purchaser or otherwise.3 0
A contract of title insurance is also defined as "... a contract to
indemnify against loss through defects in title to real estate or liens
or incumbrances thereon." 31 New York courts have stated that the
contract ". . . is one of insurance against defects in title, unmarket-
28 Trenton Potteries Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 176 N.Y. 65, 72,
68 N.E. 132, 134 (1903); Palliser v. Title Ins. Co., 61 Misc. 490, 491-92, 115
N.Y. Supp. 545, 546 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
29 See Holly Hotel v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 147 Misc. 861, 264 N.Y.
Supp. 3 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 239 App. Div. 773, 264 N.Y. Supp. 7 (1st Dep't
1933).
30 FROST, GUARANTY INSURANCE § 162 (2d ed. 1909) (emphasis added).
31 1 COOLEY, INSURANCE 12 (2d ed. 1927) (emphasis added).
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ability, liens and encumbrances .. .designed to save him harmless
from any loss through defects, liens or encumbrances that may affect
or burden his title." 32
An analysis of these definitions reveals that the authorities are
substantially in agreement as to the nature of the title insurance con-
tract. The one cohesive element in them all is that all agree that the
insured is to be kept free from loss.3 3 This apparent point of agree-
ment, however, is the very element upon which the courts have dis-
agreed. The issue has been when does the insured suffer that type
of loss for which the insurer is to be held liable under the contract
for title insurance?
"Loss"--As Construed by the New York Courts
"'Loss' is a relative term." .4 This is perhaps best illustrated
by the fact that what is today the landmark case in New York on
this point is a result of the reversal of the Appellate Division 35 by
the Court of Appeals in the case of Empire Development Co. v. Title
Guarantee and Trust Co.3 6 In that case, the vendors agreed to assume
and pay the assessments which had become liens at the time of the
signing of the contract. However, they were not willing to pay any
assessments which thereafter became liens. Accordingly, the contract
provided that the purchaser, plaintiff in this litigation, should take
title subiect to all assessments that would subsequently arise. There
was pending at that time a proceeding for opening a street which ran
through the property. Before title was closed, assessments for this
improvement were confirmed and became a lien on the pronerty.
Thereafter, the title was closed and plaintiff in this action paid the
assessment as agreed in the contract of sale. The title insurance
policy was in the usual form and contained a schedule which enu-
merated the liens, charges and incumbrances affecting said premises
which the policy did not insure. In this schedule, no reference was
made to the assessment here in issue which had become a lien before
the policy was issued.
An examination of the holding in each appellate court will help
to demonstrate the two basic theories or approaches to the problem
of what constitutes loss.
In the Appellate Division, the term "loss" received a narrow con-
struction. The court felt that the plaintiff was not seeking mere in-
32 Trenton Potteries Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 176 N.Y. 65, 72,
68 N.E. 132, 134 (1903) (emphasis added).
33 See text at notes 29-31 supra.
34 Foehrenbach v. German-American Title & Trust Co., 217 Pa. 331, 66 Atl.
561, 563 (1907).
35 Emnire Development Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 171 App. Div.
116, 157 N.Y. Supp. 68 (1st Dep't 1917).
36 Empire Development Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 225 N.Y. 53,
121 N.E. 468 (1918).
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demnification, but that a recovery would make the policy take on the
form of a wagering contract. Their reasoning was that since the
plaintiff already agreed to pay the money, he suffered no pecuniary
loss and his recovery from the insurance company would not be a
return to his status quo but would actually result in a profit on his
part. The court said, "it [plaintiff] cannot be said to have been
damaged by paying that which it had expressly agreed to pay in any
event." 37 Further, ". . . it is very well settled in this state ... that
a policy of title insurance is essentially and solely a contract of in-
demnity and not a wagering policy." 38 From this it was reasoned
that a plaintiff declaring on such a policy may only recover his actual
loss. Since by the terms of the contract of sale the plaintiff would
have been obliged to take title no matter how many assessments were
later found to be liens on the property, ". . . the failure of defendant
to discover . . . the assessment . . . imposed no burden upon the
vendee that he had not already agreed to assume." 39 Therefore he
had suffered no loss and judgment was rendered for the defendant.
The Court of Appeals felt that in the case of contracts for title
insurance, recoverable loss should not be limited to only the precise
amount of pecuniary damage caused the insured by the contingency
against which he sought protection. They said that the contract of
insurance specifically included just such a judgment as was rendered
against plaintiff as a loss to be protected.40  In spite of the fact that
plaintiff had contracted with another to pay this sum, his paying the
assessment was a "loss" nevertheless.
The Court of Appeals also felt that the parties themselves in-
tended this interpretation of the contract. "The schedule of excep-
tions refers to a purchase-money mortgage executed by one of the
plaintiffs; a reference not necessary if the construction given by the
Appellate Division is to prevail." 41 If the defendants were to escape
liability on the street assessment because plaintiff agreed to pay it,
the court felt that they should similarly escape liability on the purchase-
money mortgage, without excepting it, since plaintiffs also voluntarily
undertook to pay it, just as they did with the street assessment.
The Court of Appeals therefore recognized that "'loss' is a rela-
tive term" '42 and that the parties have a right to set the standard by
which its existence or non-existence is to be determined. Once they
found a loss as determined by this standard, set forth in the contract
37 Empire Development Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 171 App. Div.
116, 119, 157 N.Y. Supp. 68, 70 (1st Dep't 1917).
38 Ibid.
39 Empire Development Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 171 App. Div.
116, 120, 157 N.Y. Supp. 68, 70-71 (1st Dep't 1917).
40 Empire Development Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 225 N.Y. 53,
59, 121 N.E. 468, 470 (1918).
41 Id. at 60, 121 N.E. at 470.
42 Foehrenbach v. German-American Title & Trust Co., 217 Pa. 331, 66 At.
561, 563 (1907).
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of insurance, the insured was entitled to compensation. Under this
court's construction, the loss the plaintiff suffered was one that the
defendants agreed to protect against. The case was reversed and
remanded to the lower court to consider evidence on defendant's
counterclaim for reformation, which had been erroneously dismissed
in the court below.
Evaluation of the Court's Construction of Loss
Legally, "it must be borne in mind that the real subject of in-
surance is not the concrete thing, but the interest which the one to
be indemnified has in the concrete thing." 43 The interest which the
plaintiff in the Empire case wished to protect was the entire fee, less
those exceptions specified in the contract. It was this interest which
he submitted to the defendant company as the subject matter of in-
surance. The company was free to insure or not to insure as it saw
fit.44 Once it did insure, however, the estate or interest which was
covered by the policy was that of fee simple less the stated exceptions.
Any defect in title which reduced the insured's interest below that
point was damage for which he was entitled to be indemnified.
Legally then, we see that the decision of the court -rested upon firm
ground.
Although the necessity for a reversal by the Court of Appeals
indicates that the intent of the parties was not eminently clear, the
fact remains that the court chose to rely on the standard set by the
parties or as the court construed their intent, rather than on some
supplemental or arbitrary standard that would have no relation at
all to the intent of the parties but would conform to a standard com-
pletely foreign to that intent.
It is also to be observed that the court may have adopted this
more liberal construction of loss in view of the fact that the contract
might be the subject of reformation.
Any rights of subrogation which the insurer might have are left
intact by this decision. If the insured had notice of the defect, he
has no right against his grantor concerning this defect. Therefore,
since he never had this right, it cannot be said that he subsequently
gave it up at the expense of the insurer. If the insured assumed the
burden of the defect, again he never had a right under which the in-
surer had a right of subrogation. But if the insurer takes without
notice, he will in most instances be protected from this defect in his
deed. The insurer may then become subrogated under this right of
the insured. The basic principle to be considered is that the insurer
43 Ibid.
44 Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Rudershausen, 164 N.Y. Supp. 15 (Sup.
Ct. App. T. 1917).
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can only become subrogated to a right of the insured; if this right
never arises, it can never be lost to the detriment of the insurer.45
The social argument most -frequently advanced in favor of the
Empire decision is the inequality of the parties. Substantially, the
argument is this: To a layman a search is a mystery and the various
pitfalls that beset his title are dreaded but unknown. To avoid a
possible claim against his land he seeks professional advice. Once
the professional has examined the risks and excepted those he finds
undesirable, should not the layman be allowed to recover for any
damage to his remaining interest? 46
Basically, and in most cases, this argument has merit. How-
ever, it is suggested that where the insured knows of the defect and
assumes it, seeking to recover for it later, a question of unjust enrich-
ment on the part of the insured may arise. Unjust enrichment, as
used here, refers to an obligation founded ". . upon the fundamental
principle of justice that no one ought to unjustly enrich himself at
the expense of another." 47 This equitable principle established itself
very gradually in the common law 48 until finally, under the influence
of Lord Mansfield, the action was encouraged so widely that it be-
came almost the universal remedy where a defendant had received
money which he was obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity
to refund.49 In the usual case involving a policy of title insurance,
the vendee who with knowledge assumed to pay an assessment has
this reflected in the purchase price. It is submitted that to allow this
person to recover from the insurer is violative of the fundamental
principle of justice referred to above.
This argument based on the unequal positions of the parties is
being further weakened by the fact that some companies now make
it a practice to deal only with persons who are represented by counsel.
The interpretation of loss as presented by the Court of Appeals
in the Empire case was followed in the recent case of Glickman v.
Home Title Guaranty Co.50 There, plaintiff's title was insured in fee
simple by defendant insurance company. The policy contained the
usual exceptions but failed to except certain accrued liens for sewer,
grading, curbing and storm drain construction. Plaintiff in his con-
tract of purchase had agreed with his vendor to assume the obliga-
tion for payment of the liens. Defendant contested liability under the
policy on the theory that plaintiff had only done what he agreed to
do and therefore suffered no loss. The court, relying on the Empire
case, struck down the defense, holding that the policy was more than
merely a contract for indemnification.
45 VANCE:, INstURANcE § 134, at 787 (3d ed. 1951).
46 138 N.Y.L.J. No. 61, p. 12, col. 6, 7 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 25, 1957).
47 Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REv. 53, 64 (1888).
48 Id. at 66.
49 Id. at 68.
50 138 N.Y.L.J. No. 61, p. 12, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 25, 1957).
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It is interesting to note that the policy in the Glickman case con-
tained a clause which provided that "no claim for damages shall arise
or be maintainable under this policy . . . for liability voluntarily
assumed by the insured in settling any claim or suit without the con-
sent of this company." 51 At this time, this clause has not been raised
as a possible means of avoiding liability. If it is raised, the defense
may possibly fail due to the practice of construing the policies strictly
against the insurer. The clause refers to the "insured" and if a time
element can be introduced showing that plaintiff assumed before he
became an "insured," the defense will fail. At any rate, contesting
this clause would appear to be the next barrier the company can raise
as a bar to recovery.
Conclusion
The Empire case has remained precedent for over forty years.
The law therefore is well settled on the question of when a loss has
been incurred under a contract for title insurance. While the broader
construction of the term "loss" is adverse to the interests of the title
insurers, it does not appear that the title insurers are taking any ac-
tion as far as changing the form of their policies to include a possible
catch-all condition. Rather they would appear to be adopting a policy
of learning by previous mistakes. If the company is ordered to pay
after litigating a claim, they must try to be more careful and be on
guard against such exclusions in their future policies.
The argument of the defendant in the Glickman case attests to
the fact that the insurance companies feel that the contract should be
considered one of strict indemnity. That argument was practically
a reiteration of the defendant's argument in the Empire case. There-
fore, the insurers seem content to limit their efforts to sway the courts
to their view of the contract as one of strict indemnity.
M
LIABILITY INSURANCE AND INTER-SPOUSE NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS:
THE EFFECT OF SECTION 167(3) OF THE INSURANCE LAW
Recently a defendant in an automobile negligence action obtained
a declaratory judgment requiring an insurance company to defend
and pay any judgment rendered against him. The plaintiff in the
,original action was the wife of one of the defendant's employees. Her
injuries were the result of her husband's negligent operation of a car
51 See Home Title Guarantee Co., policy of title insurance, NYBTU Form
No. 100 C, Condition 3(g).
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